The fourth NetForum meeting took place on March 14th,
2013. The discussion centered around a hot issue in the world of fast growing
Web companies: the respective roles of the Founder CEO and the Professional
CEO. This issue touches one of the
foundational elements of any business, the management, but is of particular
relevance to fast growing companies because they can run through growth stages
very quickly -- very often there is no time to allow a founder to retire, or
mature, and a transition to a professional CEO if not done perfectly can cause
the business to miss a beat and just collapse.
Investors will not fund a business without a strong management, or the
ability to install one quickly, and strategic buyers always look to secure the
continued participation of key employees in a M&A transaction to ensure
they are not buying a company devoid of its creative motor. Jamie McGurk, the
in-house Corp Dev/M&A partner at Andreessen Horowitz in Menlo Park, joined
the group to share his insights on the topic.
His role is in line with Andreessen's public stand that they prefer to
deal with founder CEOs (http://bhorowitz.com/2010/04/28/why-we-prefer-founding-ceos/)
and that THEY, as a firm, need to mold themselves to work with founder CEOs.
Andreessen Horowitz (“AH”) was founded to be the model VC
firm that Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz wished they had had as an investor
when they were founders at Netscape and Netops.
This is in contrast to the traditional VC firm with a small number of
General Partners, each sitting on multiple portfolio company boards and each an
island of knowledge and contacts, without the institutionalization of
information sharing across the firm and without a way to systematically add
value to portfolio companies in all the areas where they need help. AH has 70 professionals in HR, Sales
Operations, PR, Corporate Development, Research, and of course Investment, that
are geared to generate deal flow, analyze it, deploy capital, help companies
recruit human capital, generate sales, do deals, raise money and exit. In the Private Equity sector there is a trend
now towards “operationalizing” – meaning adding to the PE firms people with
operating experience who can add value to businesses to complement and
potentially supplant the much maligned number crunchers. These are similar ideas in parallel fields
challenging the status quo, until they create a new paradigm…
Studies showed that within 3 years of an investment, VCs had
replaced somewhere between 50-70% of CEOs.
Some CEOs have the self-awareness that they are not the right person for
the job, either because that’s just not who they are, or because the job
outgrew them, so they have asked to be replaced. Many around the table supported this idea,
having experienced it first hand or having seen it in their companies or in
companies in which they had invested.
An issue that was brought up is that sometimes the
rank-and-file knows that the CEO is not the right person for the job but no one
on the Board is doing anything about it.
A comment that was made by a serial CEO is that his experience was that
VCs were leaning over backwards not to replace the CEO and that sometimes the
Board acted too late. So instead of there being an evil plan to go in and
replace the CEO, there could be an opposite predisposition, a reluctance to
take action when needed. Investing in
good people and helping them become good CEOs could work but failing to either
a) truly help a CEO that is doing poorly or b) replacing him or her fast is a
breach of a Board’s fiduciary duty. But one
can understand why group dynamics can prevent 5-7 people working as a group to
eject one of their own from his or her seat…
Another question that came up was whether the founder-led
companies actually produce better results for investors. There is data that indicated that founder-led
CEOs generated better IRRs than those led by professional CEOs. The data was challenged by some of our
members on the basis that it was inherently biased. Basically, if you have a great company led by
a great CEO, why bring in a professional CEO?
Hence, the professional CEO hiring may be an indicator of sub-optimal
performance compared to the ideal case of the founder who gets it all right and
rides into the sunset. This makes sense as
any CEO change causes a disruption and a loss of institutional knowledge, so
the mere fact of replacing the CEO, especially a founder CEO, is a high-risk
endeavor and it can take a while for everything to settle down. If it works out, the professional CEO brings
a productivity boost that should make up for the disruption caused by the CEO
change. But sometimes it does not.
Participants discussed the fact that the founder is often
the embodiment of the company and it is hard for someone new to come in and
become all of that. Yet, it was pointed
out that it is an absolute requirement, that the CEO of a startup, founder or
not, must convince the team that he or she is now the soul of the
business. Professional CEOs who come in
to replace a founder may never have that credibility, or may need to work extra
hard to acquire it.
The discussion shifted from a focus on Founder CEOs to
“founding teams.” Several people work
together to start a company and over time, someone emerges, a natural born
leader and becomes the unmistakable CEO.
Sometimes, the founding CEO develops the awareness he is not the right
person to do the job as it has evolved and gets a new CEO to replace him. Reid Hoffman wrote a nice blog on his
experience bringing Jeff Weiner to run LinkedIn, describing it as bringing a
new founder, even if he was not the founder.
Members discussed the importance of securing the
participation of founders when they are still CEOs in the context of corporate
M&A. Members who have responsibility
for M&A for their companies discussed the importance of making a proper
transition that captures that knowledge base during M&A transactions.
There was also a discussion of Richard Branson, an
illustrious founder CEO, who is the embodiment of his company to the outside
world. Many wouldn’t have hired Sir
Branson when he got started but that he has done a great job understanding the
need to surround himself with great talent, allowing him to remain and succeed
as CEO for so long.
The conversation over how fast growing startups should be run, and what is the role of the founder, continues, with Zynga's management structure. I recommend the blog posted by Ben Horowitz of Andreessen Horowitz on the new Command Structure at Zynga. Ben does not like it because it will slow down the decision making process in a fast growing company. Interesting. Speed is valued over reflection. Is this right? In situations where there is no right answer, its just a matter of choosing A over B, then speed matters because there is no value in waiting, the decision is not better because it was thought over. But if there is a wrong choice and a good choice, then why not wait, and force a discussion at the top, even if it slows the decision making process? Personally, I like the CEO at the top and one person calling the shots, as long as the person has the intelligence to know his/her limitations and be inclusive. Let others talk first, then ask questions, then decide. That's my mantra. Anyway, here's the blog by Ben, see for yourselves. http://bhorowitz.com/2013/07/03/shared-command/
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